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The Politics of Protection: Interpreting 
Commercial Policy in Late Bourbon and 
Early National Mexico 
R ICHARD J. SALVUCC I , LINDA K. S ALVUCC I , 
AND ASLAN COHEN 
The breadth, depth, and persistence of political instability in independent 
M exico have long been the object of historians' attention. "Mexico," writes 
one, "experimented with monarchy, moderate constitutional republic, radical 
populist regime, conservative government, and liberal government; each in 
turn failed to produce stability."r From 1824 through 1853, Mexico experi-
enced the "institutionalized disorder" of "manifold pronunciamientos . . . 
endless cabinet changes, and several lurches to the political left or right." 2 
Repeatedly invaded, blockaded, partitioned, and plunged into civil war 
between 1835 and 1867, Mexico was for most of its early history more a 
geographical expression than a political one. "The present state of anarchy 
[has] lasted for a quarter of a century," edirorialized The &onomist in 1861. 
"There is no power in Mexico .... It is not a nation. It is not a state. It is not 
a government at all. "3 This was not an isolated opinion. 
Endless turmoil-the absence of an effective, legitimate, and enduring 
center of power--gives rise to no end of explanations. Lucas Alaman (1792-
1853)-historian, statesman, political economist, and above all no liberal-
blamed skepticism, the Enlightenment, and the collapse of the Spanish Empire 
for Mexico's difficulties. The fall of the Bourbon monarchy in 1808 revealed 
deep divisions whose legacy Mexico had never quite overcome. Catholicism 
and colonialism were the elements that had bound the nation, but they did so 
no longer.4 In a different vein, Thomas Jefferson spoke for republicans who 
found Spanish America's "regal Catholicism" abhorrent. By 1817 Jefferson 
was predicting a future of Bonapartes, if not Bonapartism, for the insurgent 
colonies.5 And, indeed, by the Mexican War (if not before), most observers 
in the United States thought that Mexico was hopelessly corrupt, ill-gov-
erned, and deficient in republican civic consciousness: a priest-ridden 
nation to which progress came slowly, if at a ll. 6 
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Economic explanations of Mexican instability focus on the trade cycle. 
In the long run, the volume and value of trade linked public finance to the 
tariff. The ebb and flow of trade made recurrent revenue crises inevitable, 
and shortfalls were "militarized" by the large share of the military in 
national spending. As Anthony Butler, the American charge d'affaires in 
Mexico in 1830, put it, "The praetorian bands of Mexico, like those of 
ancient Rome, must have money and indulgences, and those who promise 
fairest secure their aid, until one promise fails or a better one is made."7 
Yet the story was rather more complex. Mexico now confronted something 
other than a world of recurring, but essentially predictable, trade cycles. For 
the independence of Mexico coincided with a profound change in the 
dimensions and pattern of international trade.8 By the 1830s, the volume and 
value of this trade were expanding rapidly, and the terms of trade-the relative 
prices of exportS and imports-were in a state of flux as well.9 
Moreover, nations such as Mexico and Peru were more than passive 
bystanders in the international arena. Each reacted to the changing circum-
stances of international trade in ways that reflected their own domestic 
political interests and economic endowments. In this context, the shaping 
of commercial policy-the making of the tariff-was a critical and wide-
spread concern of early national political economy in Spanish America. 
There were perfectly logical reasons for this pervasive concern. Only trade 
restrictions in some form could "moderate" the disruptive effects of the 
new trade in wage goods, such as inexpensive cottons. Trade adjustment 
in early national Spanish America was a prolonged, painful, and costly 
process. As patterns of comparative advantage shifted, protection offered 
relief, if not salvation, to producers whose very existence was threatened. 
In independent Mexico, then, political economy was essentially the politi-
cal economy of the tariff. The economics of the tariff was the economics 
that really mattered. Hence the focus of this essay. 10 
History and Theory 
The story begins with the commercial history of the Spanish Empire 
under the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons. Io broad outline, the tale is well 
known. 11 Here we need only repeat that trade between the Indies and Spain 
was in theory governed by a detailed and closely regulated regime. For 
fiscal and military reasons, formal access to the trade was restricted to 
licensed groups of merchants in Mexico City, Lima, Seville, and, later, 
Cadiz. Of course, the reality was far different. English, French, Dutch, and 
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Portuguese smugglers had made significant inroads into legal trade by the 
late seventeenth century, and crises, such as the War of Spanish Succession 
(1700-1713), were marked by pervasive contraband.12 
Nevertheless, it was not until the eighteenth century that formal, system-
atic changes in the trading system were undertaken. Until the 1780s, 
consumer demand in the Indies (with the exception of small, peripheral 
economies such as Chile, Venezuela, and to a lesser degree Peru) was far 
from integrated into the international economy. Historically, Spanish fleets 
carried textiles that cost far too much to be consumed by any but a small 
segment of the colonial elite. In Mexico perhaps one in six people could 
afford imported textiles at the end of the eighteenth century, and some 
contemporaries judged the market even smaller. 1 3 
Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century, significant changes in this 
well-established regime were clearly visible. Because of the growth of 
mining, Mexico's capacity to import expanded, and its demand for imports 
increased. Contraband grew to perhaps half of all international trade, and 
the colony's older artisan textile industry was placed at risk. 14 
In other words, the extension of "free trade" to Mexico after 1789 
revealed the nature of its comparative advantage. With the advent of 
this looser system, the famous if misnamed comercio Libre, Mexico 
received larger quantities of European (and English) textiles than be-
fore. As the supply of shipping to the Indies grew, the cost of transpor-
tation fell (abetted by technological improvements), and cheaper goods, 
such as English cottons, could be imported. The new system may not 
have been revolutionary, but the traditional import-export merchants, 
who hated competition, protested vigorously. 15 By the l 8 l os some of 
them alleged that the old woolen manufactories of Queretaro, Mexico 
City, and Guadalajara-holdovers from an age when the colony of 
necessity produced much of its own textiles-faced a cost disadvantage 
of as much as 50 percent in dealing with imported British cottons. The 
artisan communities of Mexico City, where thousands went unem-
ployed, and those in Puebla, Queretaro, Oaxaca, and San Miguel 
demanded protection from imports. These complaints continued well 
into the 1820s and 1830s. r6 
In the century after l 7 5 o, in short, the Mexican economy entered a new 
international environment. The growing productivity of British textile 
manufacturing and shipping led to a sharp fall in import prices, particularly 
after the transient inflation of the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) had 
passed. The volume of international trade then expanded dramatically after 
181 5, and the terms of trade slowly improved. 17 
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Still, old patterns of production in Mexico died hard, and painful 
adjustments were necessary. The manufacture of colonial woolens, for 
example, was nearly as old as the Spanish presence in Mexico and supplied 
everyday fabrics for a variety of uses. It could not withstand the "new 
international order" of the nineteenth century. By the late 1810s, the price 
of imports into Mexico had fallen sharply. By the 1820s, it was reportedly 
a half or a third of what it had been under the old Hapsburg fleet system. 18 
Nevertheless, as David Brading pointed out nearly two decades ago, the 
impact of comercio libre was by no means uniform. As new merchants in 
Veracruz, for example, competed away the profits of a formerly restricted 
trade, alternative investments became more attractive. Indeed, Brading 
ascribes the late colonial mining boom in part to a flow of resources from 
other sectors of the economy. 19 In this he was undoubtedly correct, as the 
following example suggests. 
Consider the case of textiles. A fall in the international price of textiles 
implied a rise in the price of Mexican silver in terms of textiles-change 
in relative prices, in other words. 20 A given quantity of Mexican silver 
could now purchase more cloth. The profitability of mining would rise, 
and in relation to it the profitability of domestic textile production would 
fall. If possible, and over time, Mexican investors would shift from 
manufacturing textiles to mining more silver; if possible, labor would move 
as well. As a result, the patterns of trade and domestic production would 
change. Mexico would manufacture fewer textiles and mine more silver in 
order to import cloth. And in fact this is more or less what happened. 21 
This example suggests the possibilities inherent in a systematic analysis 
of responses to commercial change in early nineteenth-century Mexico. 
And indeed, models of trade adjustment provide one avenue of study. They 
explain the shape and substance of commercial policy in an economy 
confronted by profound changes in the international arena. But just as 
important, they illustrate Mexico's ability-or inability-to adapt to 
changes that coincided with the early years of independence. In so doing, 
they shed more than a little light on the dynamics of the economic crisis 
that confronted Mexico after separation from Spain. 
A Specific-Factors Model of Trade 
Let us examine a simple model of the Mexican economy at the end of 
the colonial period, a so-called specific-factors or short-run model. u It 
assumes that the economy has only two sectors, textiles (T) and mining 
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(M), and that only capital (K) and labor (L) are employed in producing 
cloth or silver. The level of capital is specific to each industry. That is, 
specific machines can be used only for a specific purpose. Looms have no 
use in mining, nor picks and shovels in weaving. On the other hand, labor 
is mobile and can move between textiles and mining. Supplies of labor and 
capital are assumed to be stable and fully employed. Finally, the economy 
is a small one; its actions have no effect on the world price of silver or 
cloth. Of course, it is possible to relax or change the assumptions of the 
model and obtain different results. 
But even modeling Mexico as a small economy whose actions cannot 
affect the price of cloth or silver is not unrealistic. At the peak of the 
Mexican silver bonanza of the late eighteenth century, the price of silver 
on the London market fell by less than 4 percent, even as production rose 
by more than 50 percent. :1.3 In other words, an elastic demand for specie 
and bullion worldwide boosted real revenues from silver production in 
Mexico almost as rapidly as silver could be mined. Small wonder that many 
Mexicans believed the road to wealth was paved with silver. 
This model has several implications. Given its assumptions, Mexican 
(domestic) prices are given by 
Pr= Pr • (I + Zr) 
Pm = Pm• (I + Zm) 
where Pr and Pm are the domestic prices of textiles (T) and silver (M) 
respectively; an asterisk denotes foreign prices, which are assumed to be 
given to the country; and z is the import tax rate levied on any of the 
commodities. Consequently, even if the country is small and cannot affect 
world prices, a change in the import tax rate will have a direct effect on 
the level of domestic prices. 
Consider what occurs when the relative price of Mexican silver (M) 
increases. (This, we recall, is what happened as English industrialization, 
changes in the supply and productivity of shipping, and modifications in 
Spanish commercial policy combined to drive down the world price of 
textiles [f] even as the price of Mexican silver remained stable.) Producing 
silver rather than textiles becomes more attractive to Mexicans, since the 
purchasing power of a unit of silver increases. As a result, resources should 
flow from domestic textile production to silver mining. But, by assumption, 
capital is fixed in each sector so that labor alone can move. As a result, 
capital in mining becomes more productive. If payments to labor and 
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capital reflect their relative productivity, the owners of mining capital 
will receive a higher return. Indeed, the rental rare of mining capital 
will increase by a larger margin than any of the prices of final goods 
(that is, textiles and silver). By the same token, the productivity of 
capital in domestic textiles would fall, and its owners would receive a 
lower return. 
What happens to labor? As workers move toward mining, their produc-
tivity in mining must fall, thus reducing the real wage. 24 However, and for 
similar reasons, the productivity of the remaining textile workers must rise, 
as does their real wage. Since, by assumption, labor is free ro move between 
sectors, wage rares must ultimately equalize, and labor will migrate until 
that result is achieved. But it is impossible to say whether or not the overall 
real wage has risen or fallen. This depends on rhe basket of goods consumed 
by labor and, in particular, on the proportion of their income (1t) given 
over to textiles. The real wage will increase only if the percentage increase 
in the money wage exceeds the increase in {1tPt + (1 - rt) Pm}. · 
If we let d denote percentage change, R the rate of payment to owners 
of capital, and W the wage rate, the results can be summarized in the 
following simple expression: 
C1Rm > oPm > oW > <1Pt > C1Rt 
The inequalities would, of course, be reversed i( the original (exogenous) 
increase had been in the relative price of textiles. 
In simple terms, the results mean that the beneficiaries of the rising 
relative price of silver (or falling relative price of textiles) are the owners 
of mining capital. The owners of capital in textiles are the clear losers. 
The position of the workers is indeterminate and lies somewhere 
between mining and textiles. As a consequence, it is easy to see rhar rhe 
owners of capital will favor prorecrion (an increase in rhe rare of rhe 
import tax) of the goods in their own industry and will oppose protec-
tion of the other. The workers' position on questions of trade protection 
is necessarily ambiguous, bur some tentative observations may be made. 
Back to the Past 
The historian's road to heaven is paved with evidence. As G. K. Ches-
terton once remarked, to enter the world of facts is to enter a world of 
limits. Did Mexicans behave in ways that accord more or less with the 
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predictions of the model? If not, then why not? And what can we say about 
agriculture, a sector that has gone unmentioned until now? 
We have already mentioned the complaints of the great import-export 
merchants about the extension of comercio libre in 1789. As Brading 
suggests, the new system altered their investment incentives and channeled 
more capital into silver mining. :z.5 Yet merchant capital had also migrated 
into woolen production in Quereraro and Acambaro. :z.6 By definition, this 
investment became less attractive, hastening the reallocation that Brading 
observed. There were also merchants and merchant houses that owned 
textile manufactories, of which the firm of Vertiz and Oteyza in Mexico 
City was the most important. :z.7 Nevertheless, there were few other in-
stances of direct ownership. The network of merchants who distributed 
domestic cloth, financed its production, and supplied raw materials was 
more important than the ownership of the manufactories themselves. 
These merchants handled cottons and woolens and could be found in 
Mexico City, Puebla, Guadalajara, Tlaxcala, San Miguel el Grande, Oax-
aca, and indeed throughout the colony. :z.S Consequently, important seg-
ments of the colonial merchant community opposed free trade. Merchants 
who had gotten rich under the old fleet system hated comercio libre. Those 
who furnished and financed colonial textile production were no more 
sympathetic. In Guadalajara, for instance, where commercial capital had 
underwritten cotton production, the merchant guild argued that imports 
from Manila would ruin local industry. :z.9 On the basis of naked self-inter-
est, only the parvenu merchants of Veracruz, tied to foreign suppliers and 
schooled in the virtues of expansive demand, generally leaned toward 
free-trade liberalism.3° And even they regarded "free" trade as their 
exclusive preserve. The participation of Havana merchants in the trade, 
for instance, was not welcome. 3 1 
If merchants who supplied, produced, and marketed domestic textiles 
were opposed to freer trade, the position of urban artisans and industrialists 
was similar. As far as artisans were concerned, there was a sensible 
economic rationale for their belief. Many urban artisans owned the looms 
they used, in effect tying their capital to the textile industry. As a result, it 
was difficult for them to move to other activities; this made trade protection 
an attractive, even vital, policy.3:z. 
A vigorous defense of the artisans' position was written in I8I I by Juan 
L6pez Cancelada, a Spaniard for whom mercantilist principles were less 
pressing than imperialist xenophobia. 3 3 He warned his Mexican compa-
triots against trading with foreigners: "The cloth and serges of Queretaro, 
Acambaro, Cholula, Aguascalientes, La Quemada, Potosi and other places 
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are what men and women wear .... I don't know if you could think of a worse 
fate than taking their money and making them wear foreign fashions .... 
Mexicans are capable of making anything made anywhere else in the world" 
{italics in original). 34 The merchant guild of Mexico City went further. Writing 
in the wake of the Hidalgo rebellion, the merchants sounded an old theme: 
"If direct trade with foreigners destroys our industry and factories, and reduces 
thousands of workers in both Americas to poverty, who can deny that this 
trade will extinguish the fire of patriotism and loyalty that still exists in their 
hearts?"35 Defenders of restricted trade had long argued that commercial 
liberalism and Spanish hegemony were mutually exclusive. As it happens, they 
may have been right.36 
Independence from Spain changed the context and possibilities of the 
debate, but not its substance. Both the Junta Nacional Instituyente (1823) 
and the Congreso Constituyente (1823-24) witnessed heated clashes over 
commercial policy. In both, spokesmen for artisan and industrial interests 
demanded outright prohibition of certain cottons or substantially increased 
levels of protection. And in both forums, their opponents argued that 
protection distorted incentives and risked alienating Great Britain, which 
had yet to formally recognize independent Mexico. Most important, the 
latter said, protection taxed the mass of consumers for the benefit of a 
smaller number of artisan textile producers. Some opponents of protec-
t ion virtually asserted this: "Our confederation is not composed of 
manufacturers, but of landowners, farmers, and miners, the true basis of 
our wealth. "37 In other words, everyone understood that commercial 
policy affected the distribution of wealth. As the tariff commission of 18 24 
wrote, "The great conflict [we] face has been to reconcile the interests of 
producers of raw materials and [those] of artisans with the least prejudice 
to the consumer."38 
The statistics available indicate that these pressures did not go unheeded, 
at least from the standpoint of artisans and industrialists. One very crude 
way of judging the strength of pressures for protection is by computing the 
implicit tariff index, or the ratio of "external" taxes {taxes on trade) to the 
current value of imports. This procedure, of course, does not produce a 
wholly satisfactory index of protection. As Robert Lipsey observes, "The 
level of the tariff rate on a commodity influences the weight of the 
commodity in the index. A sufficiently high tariff could conceivably remove 
itself from the index by eliminating the import."39 Indeed, the Tariff of 
18 3 7 legislated the outright prohibition of most inexpensive cottons. As a 
result, the statistics that appear in table r, especially in the 1 84os, are 
conservative measures of the level of protection. 
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Table r Implicit Index of Tariff Protection: Trade Taxes as a 
Percentage of Current Peso Import Values 
Year Percentage 
1821 25 
1825 32 
1825-26 46 
1826-27 47 
1827-28 30 
1840 36 
1841 42 
1842 44 
1843 55 
1844 56 
1845 35 
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Sources and Computation: 1821 assumed as a maximum from the ad valorem 
rate. Trade tax figures from Estadisticas hist6ricas de Mexico, 2:629, cuadro 18. 3. Peso 
imports from 1840 through 1845 estimated as the sum of France, United States, and 
Great Britain, drawn from Ines Herrera Canales, El comercio exterior de Mexico 
(Mexico, 1977), 82. Trade taxes include relatively small figures for export duties. See 
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio exterior de Mexico (1853; Mexico, 1967), Table 
4 3. There are discrepancies between the totals reported by Lerdo de Tejada and by the 
Estadfsticas hist6ricas, which draw on data supplied by Matias Romero. 
At no time in the mid to late I 8 20s did the ratio of external taxes to the 
current value of imports fall to anything approaching its low level in 1821, 
and by the early 1840s, it was nearly twice as high. In its movements, the 
statistic confirms what historians now know. After an early flirtation with 
low tariffs, Mexican politicians opted for significantly higher levels of 
protection. We have thus far suggested why there was significant protec-
tionist pressure, but we have not explained why there was significant tariff 
protection. To make sense of what happened, we need to return to the 
model, to consider the role of agriculture, and to assess the relative strength 
of groups that could benefit from commercial liberalization. 
From the standpoint of the model, miners were most favored by low 
taxes on trade. But there were not that many miners or mine owners. 
Brading gives a rough estimate of "three thousand odd mines found in New 
Spain by the last decades of the colonial period. "40 Even considering the 
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complex connections among suppliers, financiers, investors, merchants, 
silver bankers, and mine owners, it is hard to imagine that more than 
l 50,000 persons (3,000 mines x 50 per mine) had a direct claim on mining 
profits, and that figure may be exaggerated in view of the tendency toward 
concentration in ownership and supply. Moreover, the abortive revolution 
that shook the colony in the l 8 l os wrecked parts of the industry, especially 
in the Bajio. Silver coined at the Mexico City mint fell from a yearly average 
of 21.5 million pesos (1800-1809) to 8.9 million (1810-19), while the 
price of silver on the London market during the 1810s jumped 10 per-
cent.41 Clearly shaken by the conflict, the cadre of silver miners that had 
constituted one of the backbones of Bourbon society existed in diminished 
form in the 1820s and exercised less influence. Its only clear objective was, 
perhaps, to maintain the unrestricted export of specie and bullion, a 
position justified by the Hume specie-flow mechanism of trade adjust-
ment. 42 
Phantom Farmers 
It is useful to look at the situation in agriculture in concrete historical terms. 
After all, there were some who saw Mexico as the potential granary for a 
Spanish Caribbean basin whose specialization in sugar, tobacco, and coffee 
was rapidly emerging. The famous secretary of the consulado of Veracruz, 
Jose Maria Quiros, said just this in l 808: "In times of peace, the island of Cuba 
can be completely supplied with necessary foodstuffs by this Kingdom [Mex-
ico] and by the other Spanish colonies. Its ports should be closed to foreign-
ers. "43 Yet in 1793 Revillagigedo the Younger, New Spain's brilliant viceroy, 
had predicted that "wheat flour from this kingdom, the most important branch 
of the export trade, will never be able to compete with that from the United 
States."44 In this case, an argument to authority settles nothing. Both men 
knew the colony well, although Quiros was not above stretching the truth to 
bring Veracruz a little business or investment. 
In fact, the historical evidence favors Revillagigedo. Even conservative 
calculations suggest that it would have been necessary to divert at least the 
entire supply of Mexico City's wheat flour to feed the city of Havana alone, 
and this by estimating Havana's needs most modestly. Mexico could not 
possibly have served as a granary for Cuba, let alone the entire Caribbean, 
whatever its own production may have been.45 Yet this same evidence implies 
that there was a potentially large Caribbean market for agricultural exports in 
the early nineteenth century. Why were Mexicans unable to tap it? 
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In the late 1770s, wheat flour exports through Veracruz averaged 
roughly 20,000 tercios per year, or some l 8,ooo North American barrels. 
The merchant guild of Veracruz estimated in 1809 that public and private 
shipments of flour to Havana regularly reached 30,000 tercios, or 26,700 
barrels. But Mexican shipments were trivial in comparison with North 
American ones. Even small Mexican exports varied inversely with North 
American shipments, as the negative correlation (-.45) between the two 
series in table 2 suggests. As North Americans sent more, the market for 
Mexican flour shrank. Mexico simply could not compete with the bread-
basket of the middle states. 
To illustrate this further, let us examine one analysis of the situation in 
l 808 by the Cuban political economist Francisco de Arango. 46 According 
to Arango, the purchase price in Puebla of roo tercios (17,500 pounds or 
89 barrels) of flour was 700 pesos. To ship the flour to the Gulf Coast of 
Mexico a substantial 400 pesos. Once in Veracruz, the cargo was liable for 
three separate municipal taxes, as well as for dockage and brokerage fees. 
Combined, these added another 126 pesos to the 1,100 already spent on 
purchase and transportation. It cost another 200 pesos to ship the flour, 
Table 2. Mexican Wheat Flour Exports to Spanish America Versus 
U.S. Wheat Flour Exports to the Spanish West Indies, 1802- 12 
United States Mexico (Tercios) 
Year (Barrels) Converted to U.S. Barrels 
1802 70,238 20,343 
1803 36,314 17,351 
1804 93,071 23,470 
1805 131,026 2,642 
1806 113,178 2,375 
1807 166,170 4,960 
1808 44,778 18,755 
1809 143,857 23,784 
1810 138,892 14,269 
181I 124,735 8,634 
1812 II9,440 1,387 
Sources: Mexican exports are drawn from Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio exterior, 
throughout and converted to U.S. barrels by multiplying by .89; U.S. exports from 
Linda K. Salvucci, "Development and Decline: The Port of Philadelphia and 
Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1823'' (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1985), 
p. 136. 
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presumably uninsured, from Veracruz to Havana. At this last destination, 
there were three more local levies plus brokerage and commission fees, as 
well as charges for delivery to the warehouse. In sum, the outlay after 
leaving Veracruz fixed another 384 pesos to the total. The overall figure 
for Mexican flour delivered to Havana thus came to 1 ,610 pesos, or about 
1 6 pesos per tercio. 
By contrast, 100 barrels of Philadelphia flour cost at most 6 50 pesos and 
weighed 2,100 pounds more than 100 tercios, so that tercio-barrel com-
parisons are somewhat biased against the North American measure. Once 
purchased, the Philadelphia flour was subject to 62 pesos in costs for 
cooperage, commissions, and insurance at 2.. 5 percent. To transport the 
American cargo to Havana cost 200 pesos, or exactly the same as to carry 
flour from Veracruz to the Cuban port. Upon arriving in Havana, the 
Philadelphia barrels paid municipal taxes, as well as brokerage, commis-
sion, and delivery fees; these came to about 1 5 pesos more than those paid 
by Mexican grain. Still, total expenditure on flour from Philadelphia 
amounted to 1, 12.1 pesos, or 11 pesos per barrel. A barrel of Philadelphia 
flour delivered to Havana thus cost 5 pesos less than a Mexican tercio, even 
though it weighed 21 pounds more and was generally regarded as far 
superior in quality to the Mexican product. 
If we look at these figures from a different perspective, the significance 
of transportation costs emerges. Assume, for the moment, that Mexican 
and Pennsylvania flour were available at equal cost, and that neither was 
subject to any charge other than transportation. In that case, the difference 
in cost between a Mexican and a Philadelphian shipment was 450 pesos 
((700 + 4 00 + 200) - (650 + 250)], or somewhat more than the cost (400 
pesos) of transporting flour from Puebla to Veracruz. Under conditions of 
competitive free trade, then, these figures indicate that Mexican flour could 
not compete with flour from Pennsylvania even if the cost of transportation 
were subsidized by the Spanish crown or extracted involuntarily from 
Cuban planters. Of course, by taxing the Mexican flour both in Veracruz 
and in Havana, Spanish policymakers only made a difficult situation 
impossible. Mexico had no comparative advantage in agriculture. 
There are some interesting implications. Had Spain not lost Mexico in 
1821, Mexico could have sold agricultural surpluses to Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. But the Cubans would have paid more for less, since colonial 
priorities inevitably take precedence over allocative efficiency. The island 
would have grown more slowly, since Cuban growth during the first sugar 
boom was tied to staples, such as wheat flour from the United States. Trade, 
as always, facilitated specialization. In such a world, Mexicans would have 
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had more agricultural employment, and Cuban planters would have pos-
sessed fewer slaves. For once, it is hard to make an issue of efficiency. An 
empire in which Cuban sugar planters played second fiddle to Mexican 
labradores requires imagination enough. 
However provocative this analysis may be, it can do no more than suggest 
why there was no agricultural export interest in Mexico. It cannot explain 
why farmers and landowners who faced deteriorating internal terms of 
trade because of protection did not protest much. Colonial interest groups 
were never reticent in their opposition to new taxes and other such 
"novelties." Why should they have been so in this case? 
There are a few possible explanations. David Brading noted the osten-
sible weakness of the landed classes in his analysis of Mexico's late colonial 
elite: "Ownership of a great estate brought more prestige than legal status. 
In general, the Mexican hacendado lacked the privileges, the fiscal exemp-
tions and the command of political office that was associated with gentry 
status in Europe."47 Or consider Guy Thomson's characterization of 
farmers in the Puebla district: "Landowners remained a shadowy and 
unassertive political force in the thirty years following Independence, in 
contrast to the more articulate merchants, artisans and manufacturers who 
devised Puebla's protectionist political economy [and] organized the pro-
tectionist lobby."48 The formation of commercial policy in early national 
Mexico clearly supports these observations. 
Mexico's class structure mattered as well. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, an agrarian "bourgeoisie" that lived exclusively on land rents existed 
only in embryo. 49 To be sure, there were small farmers-the la brad ores of 
Atlixco, for example-who specialized in growing cereals for the domestic 
market. For most large landowners, however, land was just another 
investment. Examples of merchant-landlords or industrialist-landlords 
(owners of obrajes who were hacendados as well) abound. To judge their 
attitudes toward commercial policy by separate economic criteria is akin 
to asking which part of their portfolios did the thinking. Moreover, 
historians know that the great estates changed hands frequently. An 
entrenched landowning class could scarcely have maintained itself. This, 
too, arrested the formation of a stable, coherent, and politically powerful 
landed elite. 
Moreover, Mexico's landowners were a disparate lot, with diffuse 
interests and incentives. Maize farmers, sheep and cattle ranchers, and 
tobacco planters were a heterogeneous group. They differed in commercial 
orientation, capitalization, and sensitivity to novel patterns (and price 
levels) in foreign trade. Even if their aggregate losses from commercial 
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policies were large, the landowners could be mobilized only with great 
difficulty. It took a major threat, such as the consolidaci6n de vales reales 
in I 804, to weld together a powerful agrarian coalition. And then, survival 
rather than mere discomfort was at issue. 5° 
Desperate Diseases, Desperate Remedies 
For various reasons, neither miners nor landowners formed parts of a 
viable coalition of free traders. Yet protection was scarcely the product of 
default. Even Mexican textile entrepreneurs experienced persistent insta-
bility in their ranks.51 Nevertheless, the demands of these entrepreneurs 
and their allies were coherent enough to shape a protectionist policy. Why? 
In part, the channels of influence through which entrepreneurs and 
merchant capitalists could operate were well defined, well known, and well 
used. Industrialists could modify policy under the aegis of the Banco de 
Avfo (1830-42) or, beginning in 1843, the Direcci6n de la Industria 
Nacional. In these years, textile manufacturers enjoyed considerable sup-
port. Perhaps the comment of the merchant Pedro Ansoategui says it best: 
"There are at present [1841) many enterprises and projected factories for 
making yarn in various parts of the republic and associated with these can 
be found persons of consequence for their wealth and connections."5:z. 
Wealth, connections, and access to power always help in making policy. 
So, too, does the use of special pleading, and in the case of textile 
manufacturers and workers, the pleading was special indeed. 
The influence of urban artisans, laborers, and their employers is easy to 
comprehend. As an organized-or even disorganized- political force, 
these groups were powerful. During the late eighteenth century, Spanish 
officials were obsessed with avoiding urban violence of any sort and took 
steps to prevent it, including the requisition of vital food supplies. 53 This 
concern translated into a distinctly ambivalent attitude toward industriali-
zation. The creation of an urbanized factory labor force with its concen-
tration of potentially seditious and unruly individuals was not especially 
desirable. 54 Such fears were seemingly vindicated in l 8 i o by the bloody 
Hidalgo rebellion, a movement allegedly nourished by the adherence of 
textile workers from the city of Queretaro. 5 5 The disruptive potential of 
the urban underclass was again emphasized in late 1828 by the sack of the 
Paricin in Mexico City.56 As a result, the specter of unemployed artisans 
and urban textile workers was worrisome to governments of all stripes. In 
the principal cities of the country-Mexico City, Puebla, Queretaro, 
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Oaxaca, Guadalajara, and Valladolid-textile workers were found in 
significant numbers. To throw them out of work was to invite disaster in 
an already tense political environment. Weak regimes bent on self-preser-
vation could not afford to have large concentrations of urban artisans and 
workers put out of work by foreign competition. Support for protection 
thus was based on painful experience as well as on political expediency. 
Desperate diseases call for desperate remedies. 
Conclusions: Beyond the Bourbon Reconquest 
Applying insights from the simple model of trade adjustment to the 
history of early national Mexico suggests several conclusions. Perhaps most 
important, divisions over commercial policy per se contributed little to 
political instability in the first decades of Mexican independence. This is 
not as counterintuitive as it might seem. There could be no real conflict 
over a matter about which, in practical terms, there was no real disagree-
ment. Of course, there was a theoretical and ideologically sophisticated 
free-trade interest in Mexico. But it represented cosmopolitan and eclectic 
thinkers familiar with Adam Smith and David Ricardo rather than any 
concrete socioeconomic interest group. The debate spilled much ink, but 
it could not have spilled much blood. We may eliminate commercial policy 
as a source of political contention. Mexico's protectionist consensus was 
based on utter realism. Protection was viewed as a matter of political or 
material survival by many, and there was little organized opposition to it. 
As things stood at the turn of the nineteenth century, Mexico could not 
compete with the United States in the growing agricultural markets of the 
Spanish Caribbean. Costs of transportation prevented it. Absent imperial 
subsidies, there could be no Cuban or Puerto Rican market for Mexican 
wheat flour. There were no Mexican estate owners bent on preserving free 
trade, for few could have seen any prospect of substantial export. 
Mutatis mutandis, there were no miners who said or cared much about 
commercial liberalism. This had nothing to do with incentives or self-in-
terest. The industry was badly damaged during the 1810s, and it took until 
the 184os before the mines were again capable of generating the same kind 
of growth that had occurred between 1760 and 1800. As a result, the 
economic contraction that Mexico faced in the early nineteenth century 
was a painful one. In the short run, at least, growth required the export of 
silver, but that possibility was largely foreclosed. Labor from the declining 
colonial textile industry could not find employment in any growing export 
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sector. Plagued by persistent underemployment, agriculture could never 
compete with silver as a source of exports. Lucas Alaman, a stateman of 
considerable brilliance, knew what he was doing in advocating both the 
rehabilitation of mining and the creation of a mechanized textile industry. 
At the same time, allegiance to established ways of doing things on the 
one hand and the changing international economic regime on the other 
created powerful constituencies. The old colonial woolen industry and an 
artisan cotton industry of more recent vintage depended on merchants for 
finance and distribution. Such merchants could not look favorably on free 
trade in English cottons, nor could the import-export merchants of Mexico 
City, who had been raised on the rents of the fleet system. Aside from 
Quiros and the Veracruz merchant guild, there were few who supported 
free trade. If merchants did not preach the gospel of expanding demand, 
then who would? 
The real losers in the process of trade adjustment that began under the 
Bourbons were naturally opposed to it. Owners of obrajes and their 
spokesmen sensibly resisted freer trade in textiles. Artisans in the major 
cities who had their accumulated capital at risk were similarly opposed. 
Their stance is no mystery. And by the same token, the very strength of the 
urban artisan class-its concentrated numbers-made insecure regimes 
loath to provoke it. Experience and an obsessive concern with urban 
violence made protection politically expedient, for tariffs protected the 
income of people and resources wedded to the industry. The political 
benefits of supporting this group were manifest, and the economic costs, 
diffused. The political costs of opposing protection, on the other hand, 
must have been all too obvious to precarious governments. 
Our final point concerns the necessary restructuring of the Mexican 
economy after 17 50. For a generation, historians have recognized the 
agricultural adjustment required by Indian depopulation over the course 
of the sixteenth century. Obscured, perhaps, by terms such as depression 
and crisis, this change has been rebaptized as a "primitive emancipation" 
by John Lynch and accorded a positive interpretation in terms of 
investment in agriculture and industry, creole political hegemony, and 
more. Yet the Bourbon Reforms themselves served to accelerate an equally 
profound economic adjustment. They represented considerably more 
than a bureaucratic "reconquest": they actually speeded the integration 
of the Mexican economy into a growing international market for raw 
materials and cheaper wage goods. Indeed, their lowering of transporta-
tion and transaction costs in international trade was tantamount to 
reducing effective levels of protection. Of all the "novelties" of which the 
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Bourbons were accused, this may well have been the most novel, and, to 
date, the least appreciated. 57 
In this sense, later protectionist policies of the early republican and 
santanista regimes were counterrevolutionary. They sought to undo 
what the Bourbon reforms had wrought. As the first president to don 
the tricolor sash, Santa Anna undertook more than a Mexican emulation 
of the July Monarchy in France. The champion of stringent tariff 
protection and prohibitions was now the nation's advocate as well. 
Nationalism and protection were thereby united in Mexican political 
culture. In the final analysis, the victor at Tam pico was truly the scourge 
of the Bourbons. 
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